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 Introduction 
 “This sector [pharmaceuticals] is going to die ... A hundred percent 
reliance on imports is dangerous.” (Tanzanian government official) 1 
 As Chapter 1 described, Tanzania has a decades-long history of pharma-
ceutical production, the sector mirroring fluctuations in Tanzania’s post-
independence industrial history. By 2004–05, the sector was estimated to 
be producing pharmaceuticals worth US$32.5 million, supplying around 
30% of the local market and exporting about 10% of local produc-
tion (MoHSW, 2006). The subsequent rise and decline of the sector is 
analysed in this chapter, locating firms’ sources of both market resilience 
and vulnerability in local patterns of ownership, finance and manage-
ment, interacting with the internationalization of firms’ domestic and 
regional markets. Finally, the chapter examines the ‘turnaround’ chal-
lenge facing the local industry. Concerned policy makers are aware, as 
the above quotation shows, of the health sector insecurity inherent in 
complete reliance on medicines imports. 
 Methods and sources 
 The chapter draws on extensive interviewing in 2013–14, some 
earlier interviews, unpublished research findings and feedback from 
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involvement of the authors in policy debates in Tanzania. 2 Senior 
managers in all five pharmaceutical firms producing human medicines 
for the private and public market that were operating at the time of the 
research were interviewed. Interviews were conducted with CEOs and/or 
production managers, using a semi-structured interview schedule that 
focussed on firms’ capabilities to supply the Tanzanian health sector. 
Interview data are not attributed to specific firms except by agreement; 
otherwise, firm-specific information is drawn from the public domain 
and referenced. 
 In addition, informants and stakeholders associated with the industry 
were interviewed, including policy makers, regulators, senior actors in 
business associations and wholesalers in public, non-profit and private 
sectors. Finally, seven firms producing non-pharmaceutical products 
relevant to the health sector were also interviewed. 
 Recent industrial rise and decline in 
pharmaceuticals 
 In 2004–05, seven pharmaceutical firms were producing medicines for 
human consumption in Tanzania (Chapter 1). There were no multina-
tionals, and only one joint venture with an external partner. The years 
up to 2008–09 then saw substantial investment, upgrading and some 
consolidation and new entry in the industry: this was an optimistic 
period in the sector. 
 Investment and consolidation 
 The largest firm is Shelys Pharmaceuticals, a pioneering firm developed 
by the Sumaria group. Sumaria is a successful example of the large, 
diversified, family-owned conglomerates that dominate Tanzania’s large 
industry sector (Sutton and Olomi, 2012). It is a regional multinational, 
producing plastics, cement and consumer goods, and moving into 
renewables. It built up Shelys as a wholly owned firm in Dar es Salaam; 
in 2003, Sumaria bought Beta Healthcare International, a Kenyan phar-
maceutical company, with private equity funding from Aureos Capital, 
making Shelys Africa Group the largest East African pharmaceutical 
company at that time. Shelys built and commissioned a new plant for 
making penicillins in Tanzania in 2008, to international good manufac-
turing practice (GMP) standards, and at the time was planning diversifi-
cation including parenterals and anti-retrovirals (ARVs) (Shelys, 2008). 
In 2008, Sumaria sold 60% of Shelys to Aspen, a South African multina-
tional, allowing private equity to exit. 3 
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 Three other larger firms were developed by Tanzanian African capital. 
Interchem Pharmaceuticals, set up in 1989 in Moshi and part-owned by 
the IPP group of companies that includes large media interests, made 
substantial investments but closed in 2008. In 1995, the government 
sold 60% of the equity in two closed government pharmaceutical firms 
into Tanzanian private family ownership, and each reopened. Keko 
Pharmaceutical Industries then made substantial investments. Tanzania 
Pharmaceutical Industries (TPI) began production in 2008 of three first-
line anti-retrovirals (ARVs) for HIV, the first such production in Tanzania. 
With European Union financial support and technical support from 
Krisana Krasintu of Thailand, TPI was upgrading its production and 
quality assurance and planning a new GMP-compliant plant for ARV 
production (Losse et al., 2007). In 2007, Zenufa, a firm with a family-
owned parent company based in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), invested in a new plant in Dar es Salaam, aiming for full GMP 
standards, with initial loan financing from the Belgian Investment 
Company for Developing Countries. 
 Also in this period, Tanzansino, a Chinese government–Tanzanian 
military collaboration, closed for planned major renovation, 4 while 
two family firms owned and run by Tanzanian pharmacists, Mansoor 
Daya and AA Pharmaceuticals, were investing and expanding supplies to 
the local market. Mansoor Daya is the oldest Tanzanian local producer, 
while AA was started in 2003. 
 By 2009, Tanzania-based production was supplying an estimated 35% 
of a local medicines market worth about US$140 million, and rising 
medicines exports had reached almost US$8 million. 5 A particular 
strength of the local firms was supply to the rural areas: rural availability 
relied quite heavily on local manufacturers, and interviews with rural 
medicines buyers in 2006–07 had found evidence of brand recognition 
and trust for locally produced medicines, especially those from Shelys 
(Chaudhuri et al., 2010; Mujinja et al., 2014). In 2009, Tanzanian phar-
maceutical production looked like a relative success story. 
 Recent industrial decline 
 Yet between 2009 and 2013, this success story turned into rapid 
decline (Wangwe et al., 2014a). By 2013, just five pharmaceutical firms 
were operating. The rising trend of medicines exports to 2009 had 
reversed (Figure 3.1). By 2013, imports of pharmaceuticals had risen to 
US$286 million on the back of rising donor spending, while medicines 
exports had fallen to US$1.7 million. Informed local estimates 6 put the 
local producers’ share of the domestic medicines market at under 20%. 
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As the market has expanded, the local firms’ share had fallen. Figure 3.1 
shows the yawning trade gap. 
 Data on availability and sources of medicines in the Tanzanian public 
and private markets confirm this declining trend in local producers’ 
market shares, for a matched sample of medicines and health facilities 
and shops (Table 3.1). 
 As the number of producers dropped, the product range narrowed. 
The only local producer of anti-retrovirals (ARVs) had been closed. All 
but one of the remaining firms had by 2013 largely ceased to produce 
basic antibiotics, and the largest firm was moving out of production of 
many other basic medicines. Local producers’ share of public procure-
ment had been falling, and only one local firm was tendering for public 
sector procurement contracts in 2013–14. A non-profit wholesaler esti-
mated buying locally ‘far less than half’ than four years previously. A 
private wholesaler, who in 2010–11 had bought local medicines worth 
Tshs 1.5–2 billion, was, he said, now buying ‘almost nothing, a few 
syrups’. The resultant decline in the local market share of a number 









1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Year
Medicines imports Medicines exports
 Figure 3.1  The expanding local supply gap: total imports and exports of medi-
cines and blood products (US$ millions) 
 Source : Drawn from Comtrade data,  http://comtrade.un.org/data/ , downloaded 5 August 
2014. 
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domestic medicines market, worth around US$250 million, had become 
supplied overwhelmingly from imports paid in dollars. 
 Industrial strengths and vulnerabilities: explaining 
sudden decline 
 The predominance of family ownership with diversified business 
activity, described above for the pharmaceutical firms, is characteristic 
of the Tanzanian industrial sector more broadly (Sutton and Olomi, 
2012). Diversified family-run businesses have a number of competitive 
advantages in Tanzania’s challenging business environment. Where 
bank finance is expensive and hard to access, diversified family firms 
can spread risk and provide access to financing which is both ‘patient’ 
(Goodluck, 2014) and also relatively low-cost and flexible. The busi-
ness structure also reduces transparency and helps to weather crises. 
Tanzania has a shallow industrial structure: other than agro-processing, 
manufacturing relies heavily on imported inputs, so firms may integrate 
 Table 3.1  Decline in domestic market share of medicines made in Tanzania, 
2006–12 
 Year 
 Percent of sample medicines available on day of visit, 
by country of origin 
 Tanzania  Kenya  Other  Total 
 2006 33 14 53 100
 2009 21 13 66 100
 2012 12 11 78 100
 Source : Authors’ analysis of WHO/HAI survey data 2006, 2009, 2012. 7 
 Table 3.2  Share of local manufactures among specified tracer medicines avail-
able in sample outlets, 2006–12 
 Year 
 Local share of available: 
 Amoxicillin 
capsules 








2006 79% 79% 81% 40% 45%
2009 74% 27% 33% 32% 26%
2012 13% 51% 43% 24% 4%
 Source : Authors’ analysis of WHO/HAI survey data 2006, 2009, 2012. 
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backwards to produce inputs such as packaging. Large diversified firms 
can gain competitive advantage by addressing in-house some ‘institu-
tional voids’ (Khanna and Palepu, 1997) in their environment, such as 
market information sources, skilled labour pools or institutionalized 
working relations with government. 
 Some of these competitive strengths can be identified in Tanzanian 
family-run pharmaceuticals. Where market information is poor and 
consumers cannot judge quality directly, as in poorly regulated retail 
medicines markets, local brand trust and recognition is a powerful 
marketing tool (Khanna and Palepu, 1997). Where the domestic generics 
market is a firm’s core business, investment in building a reliable generics 
brand benefits both consumers and manufacturer. All the pharmaceu-
tical manufacturers interviewed had relied on capital from other parts 
of diversified family business, including property and trading. One firm 
was producing its own bottles, while two relied on overseas companies 
within a business group for quality assurance of inputs and access to 
technological information. 
 However, the vulnerabilities of family-based industrial organization, 
and of the shallow industrial structure, were also evident in the inter-
views. Reliance on imported inputs lengthens production schedules and 
increases quality risks. All firms had problems sourcing good packaging 
locally, and poor packaging of local products was a common complaint 
by Tanzanian health sector buyers. The financial and reputational risk 
associated with quality problems implied reliance on imported blister 
strips from India. Some firms had found locally bought bottles to be of 
unreliable quality and had switched to imports. While plastic containers 
for bulk tablets (sealed first into clean plastic bags) were made locally, the 
shallow industrial sector constrained improvements in local upstream 
supply. For example, a shift by pharmaceutical firms from glass to plastic 
bottles – desirable for safety and supply reasons – required substantial 
related investments by both pharmaceutical and plastics firms. At root 
of the problem was the small number of firms and a lack of mutual trust 
and coordination, posing a major hurdle to mutually beneficial indus-
trial upgrading. 
 Access to technology and information was also generally constrained. 
Some firms relied on hard-pressed CEO’s visits to trade fairs, and on estab-
lished suppliers, for technical information, for training and upgrading 
support, and sometimes for trade credit. Ensuring quality of inputs 
from Asian suppliers was a constant challenge. Machinery suppliers – 
predominantly Indian or Chinese – installed, trained and provided 
spare parts and advice. Two firms had gained external donor support for 
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technical upgrading and capacity expansion. All trained their own staff 
and complained of the difficulties of finding and retaining pharmacists 
and pharmaceutical technicians. This small cluster of Tanzanian phar-
maceutical firms apparently collaborated rather little, and benefitted 
from few spill-overs or linkages between firms. 
 Changing context and responses 
 The Tanzania-based industry is operating in a very open market context, 
where shifts in the relevant international market segments are imme-
diately experienced within Tanzanian domestic and regional markets. 
Structurally and technologically, several worsening pressures appear to 
be producing a tipping point. The first relates to size and market posi-
tioning. Pharmaceutical firms in Tanzania mainly produce basic essen-
tial generic medicines and over-the-counter items such as cough syrups. 
Economies of scale are limited in basic formulations (Chaudhuri and 
West, 2014) but are large in active pharmaceutical ingredient (API) 
production. While small firms can compete, therefore, in formulations, 
they are at a structural disadvantage to large Indian exporters since they 
buy small API lots from Asian suppliers, some of whom also produce 
formulations. As one manufacturer put it, the ‘key constraint in this 
market is demand’. If firms cannot sell sustainably, they cannot grow, 
and they need their home market as a basis for expansion. 
 The second pressure is technological and regulatory: firms are forced 
into a cycle of constant upgrading, both to meet rising international 
standards that are requirements for different levels of market entry, and 
to meet competitors’ quality standards. Constant upgrading of firms’ 
technological capabilities (Bell and Pavitt, 1993; Lall, 1992) is central to 
firms’ competitive survival in pharmaceuticals, to sustain quality at a 
competitive price and to retain market access. For all the firms, the tech-
nological challenge was framed by Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) 
standards. 
 GMP constitutes a production  culture to be attained (see also 
Chapter 12). GMP Guidelines 8 emphasize documentation and validation 
of the production flow, including effective quality control (independent 
of production management); high standards of hygiene and preven-
tions of cross-contamination; effective and documented staff training 
and qualifications; and well-maintained equipment and premises. 
Our interviewees noted the extent of professional judgement in GMP 
implementation of, for example, ‘adequate’ ventilation, ‘high’ levels of 
hygiene, risk evaluation drawing on ‘experience’ and ‘well-designed’ 
documentation. 
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 The Tanzania Food and Drug Authority (TFDA) presses for GMP adher-
ence. Tanzanian firms either have attained locally acceptable GMP stand-
ards or are working towards them with TFDA support. Manufacturers 
agreed that TFDA required standards rise over time, just as do the stand-
ards achieved by international competitors and the expectations of 
international buyers. None, when interviewed, had WHO prequalifica-
tion of individual products to allow them to tender for donor-funded 
contracts. 
 All firms reported recent and current substantial investment – relative 
to their capacity – in technological upgrading. Major investments 
included new machinery for expanding capacity or for automating 
processes to improve quality control and lower costs. Other investments 
included expensive improvements in air handling and plant standards 
(e.g. door seals and room separation) and production flow reorganiza-
tion. One firm had just put in a new product line, and another was 
engaged in an expensive upgrade of tablet quality to produce higher 
compression. This last firm was aiming, with donor financial and 
technical support, for WHO product pre-qualification for a combina-
tion therapy. Most firms experienced financial stress in achieving these 
investments, which they saw as essential to stay in business. 
 A third interconnected pressure comes from donors’ tendering proc-
esses. Donors such as the Global Fund 9 procure a large share of medi-
cines used in Tanzania (see also Chapter 8). Their large-scale tenders and 
the market entry requirement of product-by-product WHO prequali-
fication 10 shuts out local firms from markets for HIV, TB and malaria 
drugs. The effect has been most damaging in anti-malarials. In 2006, 
about 90% of the then first-line treatment for malaria (sulphadoxine-
pyrimethamine [SP]) was sourced locally. From 2007, Tanzania shifted 
to the more expensive combination artemisinin-lumefantrine (AL) 
first-line medication. Subsidized supply by the Global Fund and other 
donors shut out local firms. Two firms developed AL formulations but 
concluded that pre-qualification (costing an estimated US$150,000) was 
unlikely to provide market access given the scale and pricing power of 
Asian competitors. One local firm lost an estimated third of turnover; 
others also suffered substantial losses. 11 
 The final major contextual pressure reported by firms was a recent 
sharp increase in price competition from imports. This was particularly 
felt for ‘beta lactam’ antibiotics such as amoxicillin. These are produced 
in a separate plant from other medicines to prevent cross-contamination, 
and all the larger pharmaceutical firms interviewed had such production 
capability. All confirmed they were becoming increasingly unprofitable. 
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One has closed its beta lactams plant; another said it would do so ‘in a 
couple of years, unless policy changes’. International tender prices for 
amoxicillin appear to have flat-lined since 2010 (MSH, 2010, 2013). 12 A 
local NGO wholesaler was buying at a landed import price well below 
a local firm’s factory gate price. One informant stated some importers’ 
landed prices were below his firm’s full materials costs. Since about 78% 
of materials costs were calculated to be APIs in 2012–13, the latter alle-
gation suggests dumping may be occurring. Local producers who up to 
2009 were successfully competing to supply amoxicillin for domestic 
use had by 2012 largely left the market, as Table 3.2 also confirms. 
 At the national level, this move up-market leaves the domestic supply 
of basic essential medicines reliant on imports, which may not be 
sustainable at current low prices, and which may not reach rural areas as 
effectively as local supplies (Mujinja et al., 2014). The government offi-
cial quoted at the beginning of this chapter saw this. Price pressure was 
also transmitted through private market competition. Around half of 
the Tanzanian medicines market is private (Chapter 8), and the number 
of competing wholesalers has been rising. 13 Interviewees contended 
that margins on private sales and public contracts had been severely 
squeezed. The financial risk attached to supplying the public sector had 
also increased, since payment delays by the public procurement agency 
(Medical Stores Department [MSD]) were increasing, driven partly 
by ‘erratic disbursement’ of treasury funding (MSD, 2013: 8; see also 
MoHSW, 2013). These pressures discouraged local firms from tendering, 
and MSD officials confirmed that the local share of their procurement 
was falling. 14 
 The larger manufacturers were responding by moving up-market, 
towards more technologically sophisticated, higher-value products 
with export potential. All continued to supply some over-the-counter 
medicines, and some higher-value items such as ciprofloxacin, an anti-
infective (Table 3.2). Firms were refocusing on the domestic and regional 
private market, narrowing their product range and investing in new 
products for export. Overseas partners could support moves into higher-
value products. 
 This business strategy carries two kinds of risk. At firm level it aban-
dons what one firm called the ‘cash cows’: the cash-generating basic 
commodities; this reduced their turnover and liquidity and hence 
capability to invest. Family firms may find this reduces their survival 
chances in the medium term. The largest firm, Shelys, had been sold 
100% in 2012 to Aspen, the South African multinational firm now 
part-owned by GSK (Aspen Holdings, 2013). The Aspen annual report 
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confirms the subsequent change in Shelys’ business strategy: pursuit of 
higher margins by largely moving out of public sector supply (down to 
5% of turnover in 2013), refocusing on the private market and drop-
ping low-margin products. Shelys’ recent investment has been largely 
in Kenya (ibid). 
 At the national level, this move up-market leaves the domestic supply 
of basic essential medicines reliant on imports, which may not be 
sustainable at current low prices, and which may not reach rural areas as 
effectively as local supplies (Mujinja et al., 2014). The government offi-
cial quoted at the beginning of this chapter saw this trend as a national 
security issue. 
 Turnaround strategies: can the pharmaceutical industrial 
cluster be revived? 
 Government policy is totally unfriendly to pharmaceutical manufac-
turing. (Experienced Tanzanian manufacturer) 
 Where industrial problems vary by activity, policy must vary too: 
selective intervention is an essential element of industrial policy. Lall 
and Wangwe (1997) argued this point nearly 20 years ago; it remains 
true today that distinct sectoral problems require distinctive sectoral 
solutions. Pharmaceuticals share characteristics with Tanzania-based 
industry generally but also face characteristic challenges (see also 
Chapter 1). Furthermore, some of the firms’ problems, as the manu-
facturer quoted above implies, are policy-based and distinctive to the 
pharmaceutical and medical supplies sectors. Furthermore, clusters of 
firms create mutual benefits in terms of knowledge flows and spill-overs 
(Nadvi and Halder, 2007; Page, 2012; see also Chapter 2), and Tanzania 
risks losing these benefits as the number of firms falls. Turnaround for 
this sector needs to be policy-led. 
 However, a shift to active sector-specific support requires change in 
the current policy approach, which, as government officials confirmed, 
currently focuses on policies to influence the general business envi-
ronment and does not address specific sectoral needs (Wangwe et al., 
2014b). The two broad policy challenges are to reverse policies that 
have the largely unintended consequence of incentivizing imports over 
local manufacture, and to generate active policy support for the contin-
uous upgrading of technological capabilities essential for local firms to 
compete in these highly globalized markets. 
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 Sector-specific policy issues 
 Around half of essential medicines used in Tanzania are obtained via 
public and non-profit procurement. MSD’s public sector procurement 
gives local firms a 15% price preference in competition with importers 
when both meet the quality hurdles. The effective preference rate 
is somewhat lower (one interviewee suggested around 9%), because 
importers’ prices are landed prices at the port, while local firms’ price 
includes delivery to MSD’s zonal warehouses. 
 Manufacturers and other interviewees argued, however, that the 
procurement and tax regimes in Tanzania specifically disadvantage local 
firms in pharmaceuticals, as compared to other industrial sectors. The 
key decision that has generated these disadvantages is the removal of 
the import duty on all finished formulations. The decision to remove 
the 10% import duty on pharmaceuticals, applying the East African 
Community (EAC) Common External Tariff (CET) rate of zero per cent, 
was announced in the 2009 budget speech. 15 Since then, manufacturers 
supplying the private domestic market have no protection against 
finished imports. 
 Taxes and duties on imported inputs therefore specifically disadvan-
tage local pharmaceutical manufacturers by raising their materials costs 
of production. The Customs Act 2008, recognizing this disadvantage, 
stated that where finished goods such as essential medicines are zero-
rated for import duties, so are their inputs such as APIs, in order to ensure 
fair competition for local producers. However, as officials acknowledged, 
this commitment has proved ‘complex’ to administer in practice. While 
APIs are zero-rated, problems arise in identifying other inputs such as 
additives and excipients; manufacturers complained that highly refined 
sugar for syrups, for example, paid a high duty but could not be sourced 
locally. Manufacturers stated that efforts to put together a consolidated 
list of imported inputs to be zero-rated had not met with a positive 
response. Requests for zero rating could also be met by harassment and 
accusations of corruption and favour seeking. 
 Manufacturers also complained of uncertainty and instability in the 
tax and duty regime. VAT was payable on many imported inputs, and 
reimbursement was reported to be slow and often incomplete. Tax rules 
changed unpredictably. Proposals to impose duty on packaging were 
reported to have been raised, then withdrawn. ‘Uplift’, whereby customs 
officials increased the taxable value where under-invoicing was suspected, 
was unpredictable and sometimes punitive. Machinery, though exempt 
from duties in principle, required an import licence which could create 
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delay, leaving a choice between paying duty or losing cash flow. One 
interviewee who was considering investing in manufacturing stated that 
in Tanzania the rules are not as clear as in Kenya, ‘where it is clear’ what 
taxes are to be paid. 
 Pharmaceutical manufacturers identified ways in which contracts to 
supply the public sector disadvantaged local suppliers. Trade credit rules 
were an example: an overseas supplier winning a public sector tender 
would be given a letter of credit. This meant the firm was paid as soon 
as the goods were delivered to the port, and it could also be used to raise 
working capital (see Chapter 15). By contrast, local manufacturers were 
paid only 30 days – or more – in arrears once goods were delivered, leaving 
working capital to be raised by the firm. If the order is large relative to a 
firm’s capacity, that imposes a large financial burden. Smaller firms said 
the risk attached to public sector tendering had become unmanageable. 
One now preferred to supply the public sector via private wholesalers. 
A wholesaler who won a tender ordered from the manufacturer, who 
supplied and was paid, thus shifting the tender costs and some other 
financial costs and risks to the wholesaler. 
 This last strategy illustrates a more general trend. There appeared, anec-
dotally, to be a shift in public sector tendering practice towards buying 
from importers who would ‘bundle’ imports with (perhaps) some local 
supplies. Pharmaceutical wholesalers/importers in Tanzania are gener-
ally representatives of external, mainly Indian manufacturers. Tanzanian 
industry, however, has historically strong links to trading capital (Sutton 
and Olomi, 2012), and some local pharmaceutical manufacturers also 
import and distribute, with or without repacking. It follows that a policy 
tilt towards favouring importing over manufacturing may quite rapidly 
result in a shift towards much higher reliance on imported commodi-
ties as traders expand and manufacturers become more ‘hybrid’ in their 
activities, expanding more into importing. 
 Increasing sophistication: the capabilities squeeze 
 Tanzania has a low level of sophistication in manufacturing, that is, a 
low share of medium- and high-technology manufacturing within total 
manufacturing value added (UNIDO/GoT, 2012: 35–36). Its pharma-
ceutical sector produces products that are relatively unsophisticated by 
industry standards. However, within Tanzania, pharmaceuticals never-
theless represent a relatively high-technology, skill-intensive indus-
trial activity as compared to much other Tanzanian manufacturing. 
The recent decline in this sector therefore threatens to reinforce a 
declining share of sophisticated manufacturing in total manufacturing 
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value added. Tanzania may be losing technological capabilities at firm 
level, retreating to a lower level of manufacturing capabilities (Warren-
Rodríguez, 2010). In this sense, the apparent crisis in pharmaceuticals 
identifies a more general problem. 
 Firms’ technological capabilities (Lall, 1992) are core determinants 
of their ability to compete. Many of the challenges described above 
concern product and process capabilities: the ability to manage and 
document the work processes following GMP guidelines, to ensure and 
be able to demonstrate quality and safety of the final product. For phar-
maceutical firms, these capabilities determine their market access, both 
locally (achieving product registration and sustaining quality when 
products are tested) and for access to the regional and international 
markets. All the firms interviewed reflected technological conditions in 
the international industry, in that they were chasing a moving target, 
facing constant pressure to upgrade. They also found it hard to sustain 
technological capabilities over time. 
 Lall (1992) distinguishes between production capabilities, investment 
capabilities and linkage capabilities at the firm level (see also Chapter 2). 
Most pharmaceutical firms interviewed in Tanzania were struggling with 
all three. 
 One of the most serious constraints on firms’ capabilities in Tanzania 
is the low level of general and technical education in the country, 
implying shockingly high levels of innumeracy and illiteracy among 
production line staff (UNIDO/GoT, 2012: 68). Firms argued that they 
have more machine downtime than would be true elsewhere, given 
operators’ limited capabilities. Lack of command of English was also a 
problem as compared, for example, to Kenya, especially when trying to 
promote people internally. The rigorous rule-following, documentation-
centred culture required by GMP is unfamiliar for staff: one CEO wanted 
to send supervisors abroad so they could get a feel for a GMP factory. The 
firms all train internally the laboratory pharmacists and chemists they 
hire, in the equipment and techniques for the factory; they all lose these 
trained staff both to other firms and especially to NGOs and govern-
ment, where work conditions are easier. Training is expensive and there 
is no local pool of skilled labour, constraining a firm, for example, from 
quickly adding an additional shift. Finally, there is a repeatedly reported 
problem in obtaining work permits for essential expatriates. 
 ‘Access to skilled labour is also a problem ... . in Tanzania, which is 
compounded by refusal to grant work permits and where granted, 
they are expensive’. (Manufacturer) 
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 Investment capabilities, including finance, technological information 
and management of investment projects, also become more demanding 
over time, as firms upgrade to meet rising required standards for exports. 
The large jump in production capabilities required to move from local 
market standards to international requirements imposed by donors 
involves investment financing, improvements in internal process opera-
tions, replanning factory layouts, retraining, improving factory infra-
structure and changing marketing capabilities. This kind of investment 
can amount to a substantial proportion of a local firm’s annual turn-
over and generally required funding support from outside the business 
and from non-bank sources. Examples cited in the interviews included 
financial transfers from other family businesses; external grant funding; 
a low-cost loan; and a joint venture partner with ‘financial muscle’, as 
one firm described it. The joint venture and grant routes to improve-
ment can combine finance and access to technology. 
 Development of capabilities in production of combination therapies 
for anti-malarial medication, in the form of two-layer tablets, provides 
an example. One firm 16 was upgrading, with financial and technical 
support from Drugs for Neglected Diseases (DNDi), to produce a fixed 
dose artesunate/amodiaquine combination tablet, primarily for regional 
export through donor-funded procurement. The formulation was 
initially produced by Sanofi, in collaboration with DNDi, which then set 
out to transfer the technology to firms in Africa. 17 To achieve this, the 
firm must meet WHO-prequalification standards at competitive cost, 
requiring changes across the production process. DNDi support includes 
the formulation, technological support and training, new machinery, 
laboratory upgrading, raw materials for the batches and technical and 
training support right through to pre-qualification. The firm itself is also 
investing substantially in quality improvements and cost reductions 
across the plant. The upgrading therefore benefits the entire plant, with 
spin-offs in improved tablet production for the local market also. 
 A second example also relates to combination anti-malarials. Another 
firm was benefitting from a new formulation available from its parent 
company, alongside support from its international network to, for 
example, assure quality of APIs at source. A third firm (currently closed) 
had benefitted from an EU grant to fund a new turnkey plant to produce 
anti-retrovirals plant for HIV/AIDS treatment. Without this type of 
substantial external input, it is hard for the firms in Tanzania to enhance 
their capabilities sufficiently rapidly to regain access to the regional 
market for anti-malarials and other medication widely purchased by 
donors. 
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 External networks and support are thus essential to survival in the 
race to upgrade and retain or regain market access. The Tanzanian phar-
maceutical firms are caught in a capabilities ‘squeeze’: as process and 
product standards rise, and as the standards become more binding as 
requirements for market access, the constraints imposed by the firms’ 
working conditions at home become more severe. Lack of a local skills 
pool, high and rising energy prices, lack of economies of scale for buying 
inputs and marketing output, poor transport and business infrastructure 
and a lack of local linkages – all these constraints have long existed, but 
have become increasingly binding in the new technological and market 
environment. 
 Policy to sustain upgrading and market access in pharmaceuticals: 
Can it be done? 
 It requires a change of mind-set for policy makers in Tanzania to turn to 
prioritizing and actively engaging in selective support of particular indus-
trial sectors. The arguments for prioritizing pharmaceuticals include the 
national security issues raised at the beginning of this chapter. Loss of 
national ability to supply one of its population’s basic needs increases 
reliance on exporters, notably from India, who may not be committed 
to production for this market medium term (Chaudhuri et al., 2010; 
see also Chapter 6). It may reduce availability and reliable supply espe-
cially in rural areas. The decline in the industry is also an element of 
deindustrialization and cumulative industrial decline, losing valuable 
skilled and semi-skilled employment opportunities, both in these firms 
and in upstream suppliers, for example in plastics and packaging firms. 
Tanzania is also losing opportunities to exploit synergies between health 
needs and financing and industrial development benefits, as compared 
to competing countries (see also Chapter 8). 
 Can this sector be turned around? A turnaround requires two key 
changes in mind-set and policy behaviour:
 an acceptance of the need for well-designed industrial protection  ●
mechanisms, and their effective implementation in stable and clearly 
explained rules; 
 an active and sustained engagement with existing firms and their  ●
suppliers, in a determined effort to deepen and strengthen the local 
pharmaceutical production system. 
 There is principled opposition by some Tanzanian officials to protection 
of the market in essential medicines. Duties, argued one official, would 
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raise prices, so ‘people would die’. This echoes emotive WHO and inter-
national NGO characterizations of tariffs on medicines imports as taxes 
that ‘target the sick’ (Olcay and Laing, 2005), or a ‘sick tax’. 18 In practice, 
however, there appear to be no studies of the tax incidence of import 
duties on medicines in comparable contexts, though the most impor-
tant influences on retail prices are likely to be the extent of domestic 
market competition, the purchasing power of out-of-pocket purchasers 
and the extent of competition between public or non-profit and private 
vendors 19 (see also Chapter 6). 
 It is, however, well established that ‘infant industry’ protection, to 
allow local firms to access markets, invest and grow  may support both 
industrial growth and increasing industrial competitiveness, so long it 
is selective and temporary, and associated with incentives for domestic 
competition and export growth (Lall, 1992: 172). In the East African 
Community, of which Tanzania is a member, the common external tariff 
is set at zero for most essential medicines. 20 Tanzania could, without 
challenging the tariff agreement, institute a ‘negative products’ list of 
items that cannot be imported unless local manufacturers are unable to 
supply reliable quality at an acceptable price. 
 The key benefit of this change would be to allow local manufacturers 
to retain and grow their share of the basic essential medicines market. 
Without this market, the firms lose scale, cost efficiency and cash flow. 
The negative list would also be a relatively straightforward policy, in 
contrast to the complex efforts that would be required to identify and 
effectively exempt all essential inputs to local pharmaceutical produc-
tion. Reducing or removing VAT on inputs to pharmaceuticals, or at 
least rapidly reimbursing the tax paid, would also shift the balance of 
incentives back towards manufacturers, as would raising the preference 
level above 15% for local suppliers in public procurement of medicines. 
 Additional practical changes that would shift the balance back towards 
local production include effective implementation by TFDA of their 
formal commitment to fast tracking of tests and registrations for local 
products (which may require additional TFDA resources). Providing 
trade credit for local suppliers to public procurement, as well as to over-
seas importers, would also rebalance the incentive structure, as would 
more timely funding by the Ministry of Finance for procurement by 
MSD of locally contracted supplies. 
 All of these policy changes are feasible, and many are implemented by 
other African countries including Ethiopia and Ghana (see Chapters 4 
and 6). However, they would quite sharply shift incentives against the 
wholesaler/importers who currently manage the bulk of private sector 
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and substantial elements of public sector medicine supply. The changes 
would set manufacturing and importing interests against each other to 
some extent, posing challenges for policy makers. 
 Active engagement with existing firms in supporting upgrading of 
technological capabilities, local input sourcing and market access would 
also assist a shift in policy direction from trading to manufacturing, by 
engaging government officials more closely in manufacturing affairs. 
There are examples in Tanzania, outside pharmaceuticals, of success 
along these lines, such as the sustained consultations with manufacturers 
that led to the successful initiation of production of long-lasting insecti-
cide treated bed nets. Manufacturing associations could strengthen their 
engagement with government. Current Tanzanian initiatives to create 
an active Task Force on Promotion of Local Pharmaceutical Production, 
including manufacturers, to improve policy and implementation in 
support of pharmaceutical manufacturing, could greatly enhance 
government-private sector collaboration. 
 Supporting continuous industrial upgrading requires a combination of 
types of support. Government policy can improve external constraints, 
for example by moderating utility cost increases, and streamlining slow, 
overlapping and expensive industrial licensing. Government can directly 
support areas where firms lack incentives and capability to invest them-
selves, such as industrial and vocation training schemes tailored to the 
needs of specific sectors, and funding for in-house training. Governments 
can work with donors to identify and tackle barriers to international 
market access for local firms. The large government shareholdings in 
pharmaceuticals, at present managed as passive holdings, could be 
actively used to support manufacturing improvement, or otherwise sold 
to support new joint ventures. Government could provide some direct 
financial support for investment. 
 The lack of industrial depth in this sector in Tanzania at present 
implies that government has a role in supplying missing ‘public goods’ 
of the type that larger clusters may generate locally: technological and 
market information; networks and introductions to help to generate 
joint ventures; active support for upgrading that would be available from 
consultants in more developed industrial contexts; and timely facilita-
tion of external expertise when required. At present, in the small cluster 
of pharmaceutical firms, each was creating its own linkages; the mix of 
competition and beneficial externalities and collaboration characteristic 
of successful industrial clusters is missing here. 
 Two government bodies in Tanzania do provide some effective advice 
appreciated by manufacturers interviewed: the Japanese-supported 
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Kaizen unit in the Ministry of Industry and the TFDA. The manufac-
turers interviewed broadly appreciated the TFDA’s practical and informed 
approach. TFDA officials are among the few in government who spend 
substantial time considering the requirements – and the point of view – 
of manufacturers. TFDA expertise could be brought into industrial policy 
implementation, perhaps through secondments, to help in changing 
the policy culture in support for pharmaceuticals. 
 Restructuring public procurement to support local firms’ domestic 
market access can also help to stimulate and fund expansion and 
upgrading. This restructuring may include a policy already under devel-
opment, to allow longer term contracts where procurement supports 
new local investment. This was being considered in relation to new 
investors, but could equally be applied to existing firms requiring longer 
contracts in order to fund upgrading. Manufacturers of medicines with 
longer public contracts could then be encouraged to use that stability 
to support their local suppliers’ investments, for example in packaging. 
Given the shallow industrial structure of pharmaceuticals at present, 
industrial turnaround will need to address the local supply chain for 
pharmaceuticals, including local suppliers. Tanzania currently imports 
large quantities of glass, air, paper and water (bottles, packaging and 
intravenous fluids) in the pharmaceutical sector; even without any 
move into producing APIs, upstream improvement of input suppliers, 
and selective increases in sophistication of technological capabilities 
could cut industrial and import costs. 
 Conclusion: staying in the ‘moving window’ 
 Sutton (2012) argues that as markets integrate internationally, price 
competition intensifies and firms respond by investing in quality, 
producing better quality for a given cost. The net effect is to shift the 
market ‘window’ that firms must access upwards over time, dropping 
out of the window firms that can no longer meet the minimum quality/
price ratio required for market entry. Tanzanian firms, facing a combi-
nation of a shallow industrial structure with few supportive linkages, a 
highly liberalized market, a policy ‘tilt’ towards incentivizing imports, 
and a largely passive industrial policy approach, have been vulnerable 
to these rising barriers to domestic and international market entry. The 
observed industrial fragility – the vulnerability to sudden decline – is 
not a new industrial phenomenon in Tanzania: for example, a number 
of the exporting firms that were the subject of an earlier industrial study 
(Wangwe, 2003) are no longer operating. 
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 This conjuncture urgently requires a more engaged industrial policy. 
However, the industrial policy literature remains thin on how to sustain 
continuous engagement between government and manufacturers 
to support constant upgrading. 21 The small, strategic, but currently 
shrinking pharmaceutical sector offers a good ground for experimen-
tation in policy renewal, given its perceived strategic importance. 
Chapter 4, on Ethiopia, provides a comparative case study of an effective 
set of turnaround policies. 
 Notes 
 1 .  All quotations are from authors’ fieldwork in 2012–14, unless otherwise 
stated. 
 2 .  This chapter is based on the research project entitled  Industrial productivity 
and  health sector performance . The findings, interpretations, conclusions and 
opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the 
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interviewees who gave time within very pressured schedules to talk to us at 
considerable length. Thanks also to Martin Bell, Paul Nightingale and other 
participants in a SPRU seminar in February 2014, and to participants in a 
Policy Dialogue workshop in Dar es Salaam in November 2014. The same 
disclaimer applies. 
 3 .  Source: Sumaria Group website:  http://www.sumaria.biz/our-businesses/ , 
accessed 6 March 2014. 
 4 .  Interview, 2010. 
 5 .  Sources: Comtrade data for imports and exports,  http://comtrade.un.org/
data/ , accessed 5 August 2014; NBS (2009) manufacturing survey for phar-
maceutical production data. 
 6 .  There was no available manufacturing survey later than 2009 at the time of 
writing. 
 7 .  Thanks to Mary Justin-Temu for access to these data; Table 3.1 uses the 2006 
sample of facilities and medicines only, for comparability. 
 8 .  East African Community Secretariat (nd)  Guidelines on Good Manufacturing 
Practice for Medicinal Products within the EAC , Arusha: late draft kindly made 
available in near-final form by a TFDA official, in 2014. 
 9 .  The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria,  www.theglobal-
fund.org , henceforth ‘the Global Fund’ in this chapter. 
 10 .  See  http://apps.who.int/prequal/ , also Chapter 12. 
 11 .  Source: interviewing of firms previously supplying anti-malarials, 2010 
 12 .  Median selling prices USD/tablet 0.0171 2010, 0.0173 2013 (MSH 2010, 
2013). 
 13 .  Sources: TFDA figures for wholesaler numbers cited in Mhamba and 
Mbirigenda (2010), and interviews. 
 14 .  An MSD accountant estimated for us that just 11% by value of MSD’s new 
two-year framework contracts had gone to local firms in 2012–13. 
 15 .  Source: URT (2009: 67). 
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 16 .  This example is reported with permission from the company’s CEO. 
 17 .  http://www.dndi.org/diseases-projects/portfolio/asaq.html?highlight=WyJ0
YW56YW5pYSJd , accessed 23 February 2015. 
 18 .  http://www.haiweb.org/medicineprices/29012010/MPM_6.pdf , accessed 23 
February 2015. 
 19 .  See Waning et al. (2010) for an interesting investigation of non-profit supply 
and its impact on competition. We have found no studies of import duties’ 
incidence on medicines prices in low- and middle-income countries. 
 20 .  The currently available EAC tariff schedule, available from  http://www.eac.
int/customs/index.php?option=com_content&id=41:common-external-
tariff-handbook&Itemid=141 , sets antibiotics’ import duties at 10%, but this 
does not appear to be implemented at present in Tanzania. 
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